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INTRODUCTION

We live in a world where infertility is no longer the problem of
a miniscule part of our population. Infertility now affects more
than 7.3 million people in the United States alone and
1
approximately one in eight United States couples. With new
scientific breakthroughs, however, more and more people are
turning to assisted reproductive technologies to aid them in their
quest to have children. From this increase in infertility and the
resulting use of assisted reproduction technologies (“ART”), the
legal landscape is now forced to reassess areas of law that have been
set in stone for decades, including the theories of contract law,
† Theresa M. Erickson is a California attorney who founded Erickson Law, PC,
which provides legal representation exclusively in the area of Reproductive Law.
Erickson is active in the Reproductive Law community through policy and
research with the American Bar Association and is also the Founder and CEO of
Conceptual Options, LLC.
†† Megan T. Erickson is a second year law student and plans to practice in the
area of Reproductive Law upon graduation.
1. ABMA J., CHANDRA A., MOSHER W., PETERSON L., FERTILITY, FAMILY
PLANNING, AND WOMEN’S HEALTH: NEW DATA FROM THE 1995 NATIONAL SURVEY OF
FAMILY GROWTH, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, VITAL HEALTH STAT.
23(19) (1997), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_019.pdf.
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property law, tort law, constitutional law, criminal law, and family
law. Along with it, these new and often controversial technologies
bring with them new legal obligations and issues for the parties
involved—and the resulting children.
One of the principal legal issues of ART, at the moment,
2
regards the disposition of embryos and whether a couple that uses
assisted reproductive technologies should be governed by the laws
of contract or by the right to procreate. More specifically, when the
couple decides to divorce and cannot agree on the disposition of
the embryos that they created through ART, the following
questions must be asked: who should have the right to procreate
and who should not? Should the couple’s informed consent
contract, which was signed before the creation of the embryos,
trump the rights of the parties individually after the embryos are
already in existence?
It is through the debate of constitutional rights versus contract
law, the debate over personhood versus property issues, and the use
3
of the denial of the writ of certiorari in the case of Roman v. Roman
that we can finally develop an enhanced legal landscape upon
which the ART community and its patients can turn to without
worrying about the legal implications of their actions in a world
where having children is often their most important goal and
desire.
II. BACKGROUND
The medical field of ART was developed in order to combat
the increasing rates of infertility around the world. ART, however,
is not only a way for medicine to combat the physical aspects of
infertility—there are also the psychological, cultural, and societal
aspects of infertility that allow people to create what once seemed
like the impossible: the families of which they have always dreamed.
The American Society for Reproductive Medicine (“ASRM”)
2. See, e.g., JUDITH F. DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 8
(2006). (For the purpose of this article “embryo” is not the most medically
accurate term but is the most easily understood term. Additionally, for the
purpose of this article “embryo” will come to mean the same as the medically
accurate term of “pre-embryo,” which means: “[t]he developing human organism
during early cleaving stages, which immediately follow fertilization, until
development of the embryo. The preembryonic period immediately follows the
zygote stage and ends at approximately 14 days after fertilization with the
development of the primitive streak”). Id.
3. Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex.App. 2006).
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defines infertility as:
[A] disease of the reproductive system that impairs one of
the body’s most basic functions: the conception of
children. Conception is a complicated process that
depends upon many factors: on the production of healthy
sperm by the man and healthy eggs by the woman;
unblocked fallopian tubes that allow the sperm to reach
the egg; the sperm’s ability to fertilize the egg when they
meet; the ability of the fertilized egg (embryo) to become
implanted in the woman’s uterus; and sufficient embryo
4
quality.
As stated above, infertility affects more than 7.3 million people
in the United States for various reasons, and those struggling with
this problem are usually run through a battery of tests to determine
5
the specific cause of their infertility. Out of those tested, nearly
44% of cases are attributed to male factor infertility, 33% are
attributed to female tubal factors, 25% attribute infertility to
problems with female ovulation, and approximately 5 to 10% will
have no readily apparent cause for their infertility even after they
6
have completed the recommended testing.
No matter what the cause, for the majority of these
approximately 7.3 million people, the resulting diagnosis of
infertility and its effects are ultimately devastating to the couple
and their relationship. While support and advocacy organizations
7
8
9
like RESOLVE, AFA, and INCIID believe infertility should be
treated as a medical condition and a disability that has a cure and
10
not a “death sentence,” the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) does not consider infertility to be a disability because it is
not “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one

4. American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Frequently Asked
Questions About Fertility, http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html (last visited
Nov. 25, 2008).
5. See ABMA J., ET AL. supra note 1.
6. AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, INFERTILITY: AN OVERVIEW
12 (2003), http://www.asrm.org/Patients/patientbooklets/infertility_overview.pdf
(last visited on Nov. 25, 2008) [hereinafter AN OVERVIEW].
7. Resolve: The National Infertility Association, www.resolve.org (last visited
Nov. 25, 2008).
8. American Fertility Association, www.theafa.org (last visited Nov. 25, 2008).
9. The International Council on Infertility Information Dissemination, Inc.,
www.inciid.org (last visited on Nov. 25, 2008).
10. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 12101 (2000)).
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11

or more of the major life activities of” an individual. No matter
how one chooses to look at the devastation of infertility, ART
remains a viable solution to infertile couples.
ART is defined as “the various medical techniques used to
achieve a pregnancy by means other than sexual intercourse . . .
[it] is used when an individual [or couple] is unable to have a child
through the age-old process that combines egg and sperm inside a
12
woman’s body.” Some of the most common examples of ART are
13
in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), gamete intrafallopian transfer
14
15
intracytoplasmic
sperm
injection
(“ICSI”),
(“GIFT”),
16
intrauterine insemination (“IUI”), and zygote intrafallopian
17
transfer (“ZIFT”).
Although ART initially focused on bypassing non-functioning
reproductive organs, it has become more complex. It moved from
merely involving the infertile couple and their doctor, to involving
11. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000); see, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,
633 (1998).
12. DAAR, supra note 2, at 1.
13. In vitro fertilization (“IVF”) is defined as: “a method of assisted
reproduction that involves surgically removing eggs from the woman’s ovaries,
combining them with sperm in the laboratory and, if fertilized, replacing the
resulting embryo into the woman’s uterus.” The Midwest Center of Reproductive
Health, P.A., Glossary of Terms (2006), http://www.mcrh.com/resources.
glossary.php.
14. Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer (“GIFT”) is defined as: “[a] medical
procedure in which a woman’s eggs are retrieved following ovarian stimulation,
mixed in the laboratory with sperm, and reintroduced into the fallopian tube
using a fiber-optic instrument called a laparoscope which is inserted through small
incisions in the woman’s abdomen. . . . [I]n order to use GIFT, a woman must
have at least one healthy fallopian tube.” DAAR, supra note 2, at 41.
15. Intracytoplasmic sperm injection (“ICSI”) is defined as: “a
micromanipulation technique used in conjunction with IVF that involves injecting
a sperm directly into an egg in order to facilitate fertilization. The fertilized egg is
then transferred to the uterus.” AN OVERVIEW, supra note 6, at 15.
16. Intrauterine insemination (“IUI”) is defined as: “the process whereby
sperm are injected directly into the uterine cavity in order to bypass the cervix and
place the sperm closer to the egg. The sperm are usually washed first in order to
remove chemicals that can irritate the uterine lining and to increase sperm
motility and concentration.” Id.
17. Zygote intrafallopian transfer (“ZIFT”) is defined as: “[a] medical
procedure in which a woman’s eggs are retrieved following ovarian stimulation,
mixed in the laboratory with sperm, and allowed to develop into early embryos
(also called zygotes, usually seen approximately one day after fertilization). The
zygotes are transferred into a woman’s fallopian tubes using a laparoscope, placed
through the woman’s abdomen, to guide placement of the early embryos. ZIFT
combines some of the laboratory elements of IVF and the tubal transfer of GIFT.”
DAAR, supra note 2, at 41.
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ovum donors, sperm donors, and/or surrogates, which only further
increases the complexity of not only the social and cultural issues,
but most importantly the legal issues associated with ART.
Moreover, most states do not have laws regarding ART and the use
of third-party participants, which generates additional legal issues
when determining what technologies are permitted in which states.
Regardless of the parties, the creation of the embryos through ART
involves legal issues such as what to do with those embryos once a
patient or patients have decided that they no longer have any use
for their excess embryos. It is estimated that there are more than
18
400,000 embryos in cryopreserved storage in the United States
19
alone; that number grows with each passing year. There are many
options for these patients who have already completed their fertility
treatments successfully or have decided not to continue with
fertility treatments. Some of the alternatives for their excess
embryos include: donation to research or another couple,
discarding/destroying the embryos, or maintaining the embryos in
a cryopreserved state—although the longer an embryo is
cryopreserved, the less chance it has of “surviving” the thawing
20
process.
With all of these options, reputable fertility clinics ensure that
each patient signs an embryo disposition document, which, along
with his or her informed consent, clarifies how the patient would
like to handle the disposition of his or her embryos once the
patient has decided to cease treatment (albeit most often without
legal representation). Yet, not all of the options listed above are
available in every state. For example, donating embryos to research
is illegal in states such as Louisiana and Kentucky, which have laws
prohibiting the destruction of viable embryos. Louisiana Revised
Statute section 129 states: “[A] viable in vitro fertilized human
21
22
ovum is a juridical person, which shall not be intentionally,
18. Cryopreservation: the maintenance of viability of excised tissues [and/or]
organs at extremely low temperatures. STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 416 (26th
ed. 1995).
19. David I. Hoffman, et al., Cryopreserved Embryos in the United States and Their
Availability for Research, 79 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1063 (2003).
20. Id. Approximately 35% of cryopreserved embryos do not survive the
freezing and thawing process of cryopreservation and of those that do survive
these processes, only approximately 25% will survive to reach the day-5-blastocyst
stage. Id.
21. Juridical: relating to administration of justice, or office of a judge.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 867 (8th ed. 2008).
22. Even though a Louisiana Statute describes viable embryos as a “person” in
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destroyed by any natural or other juridical person or through the
23
actions of another such person.”
In states that do allow performing research on embryos, there
are also laws to ensure that the patient is fully aware and consents
to a specific type of research for which his or her excess embryos will
24
be used. One such state that has a law of this type is California,
which ensures that a fertility clinic will only be able to use those
specific embryos for a specific type of research and not for any
25
research for which it feels the embryos will be effective.
Some state legislatures have responded by drafting these laws
(specified above or not) in record time to ensure that the
disposition of each embryo is legally accounted for and that the
wishes of each patient are taken into account. The law, however,
continues to be bombarded with new and complex issues of law
and public policy due to the increasing rates of diagnosed infertility
and the rapid advancement of ART around the world, especially
26
since the first “test tube” baby was born in the late 1970s. It is
because of the advancement of these technologies that the laws in
the state and federal judicial systems have been fundamentally
unable to keep up with their development. This lack of legal
development has created a black hole in the area of ART and the
law. Many legal questions have been only partially answered, or not
answered at all, leaving doctors, patients, and legal practitioners
with an incomplete path to follow.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Constitutional Law v. Contract Law
The legal landscape of ART becomes all the more complex
when a couple divorces and cannot agree on who should be able to
make the decisions regarding the disposition of their frozen
embryos. Although the law itself has attempted to make these
the judicial sense, most states do not give the status of personhood to embryos,
especially those that are existing in cryopreserved space outside of a woman’s
womb. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 129 (2008).
23. Id.
24. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315 (2008).
25. See generally id. (discussing the process for obtaining a donor’s consent).
26. The world’s first “test tube” baby was Louise Brown, born in 1978. BBC
HOME,
1978:
First ‘Test Tube Baby’
Born,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/
onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/25/newsid_2499000/2499411.stm (last visited
Nov. 25, 2008).
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decisions, there are only a handful of cases (often with no binding
precedent) that are available to aid the judicial system in
determining whether the disposition of embryos should be
analyzed under contract law or as a constitutional right to have or
not to have children, which is defined as procreative liberty.
Professor John Robertson described procreative liberty as follows:
[As] a matter of constitutional law, procreative liberty is a
negative right against state interference with choices to
procreate or to avoid procreation. It is not a right against
private interference, though other laws might provide that
protection. Nor is it a positive right to have the state or
particular persons provide the means or resources
27
necessary to have or avoid having children.
If Robertson is correct in this assumption, however, which one
of the divorcing parties’ rights supersedes that of the other? By
focusing on a constitutional right to procreative liberty, the judicial
system would be proactively creating a selective bias that favors one
party’s constitutional rights over the other’s. With that in mind,
the end result would ultimately negate the actual purpose of these
“rights” in the first place.
In her article The Parent Trap: Uncovering the Myth of “Coerced
Parenthood” in Frozen Embryo Disputes, Ellen Waldman asserts that the
constitutional right to have children is the only right that should be
28
She states that “[w]hen considering the burdens of
upheld.
forced paternity . . . [l]egislators could relieve objecting spouses of
their concern over financial liability by simply treating objecting
29
However, this
spouses as nothing more than sperm donors.”
would take years because one currently does not have the legal
right to contract out of any potential financial obligations to a
30
child.
Yet, simply legislating out of parental rights does not always
wrap everything up into a tidy gift-wrapped package. It actually
completely bypasses many parties’ beliefs (those who want to avoid
27. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 23 (Princeton University Press 1994).
28. Ellen Waldman, The Parent Trap: Uncovering the Myth of “Coerced Parenthood”
in Frozen Embryo Disputes, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1021, 1060 (2004).
29. Id. at 1037.
30. Id.; see also Grijalva v. Grijalva, 310 S.E.2d 193, 197 (W. Va. 1983) (The
court ruled that parents are not able to contract away the rights of their children
because the aspect of financial support of a child is not for the other parent, but
instead the right of the child to have both parents financially obligated to support
him or her). Id.
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procreation) that they will be psychologically impacted by the
knowledge that they have a child somewhere in the world.
Waldman goes on in her article to use a balancing test to make her
argument against this premise by stating that in order to decide
which right should be favored, the judicial system needs to
determine the burdens as follows: “[w]hether the burdens of
unwanted paternity to the ‘would-not-be-father’ exceed the
deprivation of a possibly last opportunity for maternity to the
31
‘would-be-mother.’”
Waldman uses this balancing test to assert that there would be
no psychological burden on the party attempting to avoid
procreation because parenthood—“or at least fatherhood—is, in
large part, socially constructed rather than biologically pre32
Waldman argues that there should not be a
determined.”
constitutional right to avoid procreation because there are no
undue burdens upon the party needing to be protected from
33
unwarranted governmental intrusions.
Waldman’s point of view, however, is not supported by the
majority of rulings decided in this area. Instead, when the judiciary
has used the concepts of constitutional law as a way to decide these
cases, they have, for the most part, decided in favor of the party
attempting to avoid procreation. One example of such a decision
34
was Davis v. Davis. In Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court was
the first state supreme court to be confronted with the issue of
35
embryo disposition.
In Davis, both parties had participated in the creation of
embryos together during their marriage; but, after multiple
attempts to achieve a viable pregnancy, the couple divorced and
36
was left with seven cryopreserved—frozen—embryos.
While going through their infertility treatments, the couple
did not enter into any agreement as to how the excess embryos
37
would be disposed of if they divorced. Following their divorce,
Junior Davis sought to have the seven embryos discarded, while his
ex-wife Mary Sue Davis wanted the remaining embryos to be

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Waldman, supra note 28, at 1060.
Id. at 1028.
Id.
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
Id.
Id. at 592.
Id.
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38

donated to another infertile couple. Since they did not have a
prearranged contract regarding the disposition of the embryos, the
court looked to the balancing of each party’s interests regarding
39
the disposition. The Supreme Court of Tennessee stated that the
central issue to the case was:
[T]he two aspects of procreational autonomy—the right
to procreate and the right to avoid procreation . . .[from
which they would begin looking at] by considering the
burdens imposed on the parties by solutions that would
have the effect of disallowing the exercise of individual
procreational autonomy with respect to these particular
40
preembryos.
The court ultimately held that Junior Davis was allowed full
control over the seven remaining embryos because Mary Sue Davis
had other means of achieving parenthood and she was attempting
to donate the embryos to another childless couple for the purpose
41
This result would essentially cause
of their conceiving a child.
Junior to have the greater interest, as he would still have the
psychological burden of knowing that he possibly has a child or
42
children out in the world.
On the other end of the spectrum, the New York Court of
43
Appeals in 1998 came to their decision in Kass v. Kass by relying
on contract law and the enforceability of disposition agreements,
instead of using a constitutional analysis as in Davis. Maureen Kass
(appellant) and Steven Kass (respondent) had signed four
informed consent forms which provided a “statement of
44
disposition” should they get divorced. They were left with five
45
frozen, stored embryos. Their informed consent forms stated that
their excess embryos should be disposed of and used for research
46
by the IVF program. Once the parties divorced, they also created
an “uncontested divorce” agreement that they both signed stating
that the “[t]he disposition of the frozen 5 pre-zygotes at Mather
Hospital is that they should be disposed of [in] the manner
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 590.
Id. at 603–04.
Id. at 603.
Id. at 604.
Id.
Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d (N.Y. 1998).
Id. at 176.
See id. at 177.
See id. at 176–77.
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outlined in our consent form and that neither Maureen Kass[,]
Steve Kass[,] or anyone else will lay claim to custody of these pre47
zygotes.”
Barely one month after signing this additional agreement, the
appellant (Mrs. Kass) commenced an action in New York to receive
48
full custody of the embryos. The trial court in the original case
decided that the appellant had full rights to the embryos, yet the
New York Supreme Court Appellate Division reversed this decision
stating that their prior agreements should control the outcome of
49
The New York Court of Appeals ultimately
this decision.
determined after its review of the case that the Appellate Division
decision should be affirmed because both parties had clearly
expressed their intentions for the disposition of their embryos
prior to their divorce and subsequently with their uncontested
50
The Court decided that procreation
divorce agreement.
avoidance outweighed the woman’s right to engage in
reproduction with the frozen embryos by interpreting the contract
51
to support that result.
That same year the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
52
decided the convoluted case of A.Z. v. B.Z. on the basis of
enforceability of contracts and dismissed the argument that the
respondent (B.Z.) had a greater constitutional right than the
53
appellant (A.Z.) to the disposition of their remaining embryos.
The appellant appealed from the issuance of a permanent
injunction against her from using the remaining embryos that were
54
created while she and the respondent were married. As in Kass,
the parties had signed informed consents from their fertility clinic

47. Id. at 177.
48. Id.
49. See id. (stating that “when parties to an IVF procedure have themselves
determined the disposition of any unused fertilized egg, their agreement should
control.”).
50. See id. at 182 (stating that “[t]hese parties have clearly manifested their
intention, the law will honor it.”).
51. See Judith F. Daar, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pregnancy
Process: Developing an Equality Model to Protect Reproductive Liberties, 25 AM. J.L. &
MED. 455, 470–71 (1999) (stating that “Maureen Kass probably did not intend that
her husband would be able to override her desire to implant the embryos;
therefore, a finding that this was her clearly expressed intent seems highly
suspect.”).
52. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
53. See id.
54. Id. at 1055.
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regarding the disposition of their remaining embryos.
These
forms were preprinted with choices regarding the disposition if the
parties were to become separated, as well as having an additional
56
blank line permitting the parties to select an option not listed.
The consent also listed that “[t]he consent form also informs the
donors that they may change their minds as to any disposition,
57
provided that both donors convey that fact in writing to the clinic.”
Although the parties signed a total of seven consent forms, the
court found that only the form signed over the course of their
infertility treatments in August 1991 governed the remaining
58
Apparently, the respondent had signed the
frozen embryos.
blank consent forms prior to the fertility treatments and gave them
59
back to the appellant to prepare and sign. The appellant then
signed all of the forms and filled in the blank space for the
disposition granting all remaining embryos to her (the appellant) if
60
they were to separate. The lower probate court ruled in favor of
the respondent, stating that there was no evidence that the
respondent agreed at the time of his signing of the agreements that
if they were to become separated that the embryos would
61
automatically go to the appellant.
These cases indicate that there needs to be uniformity among
courts as to how clinics can ensure that their patients sign valid and
enforceable disposition forms. These cases further indicate that
any result should not be made on the selective basis of whose
procreational rights outweigh the other or by choosing whose
procreational right was more important than the other’s. If this
line of reasoning is followed, it would completely negate what
United States Supreme Court Justice Brennan stated in Eisenstadt v.
Baird: “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
62
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”
Under this viewpoint, if the courts were to use constitutional
rights to decide whether one should have a child (in the sense of
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1054.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at n.10.
Id. at 1054.
Id.
See id. at 1054–55.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
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ART only), it would be purely unconstitutional. It is only with a
compelling state interest that the government can interfere, as
63
decided in Carey v. Population Services International. In Carey, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that for the government to step
in and decide cases such as these, there would need to be a
compelling state interest: “[W]here a decision as fundamental as that
whether to bear or beget a child is involved, regulations imposing a
burden on it may be justified only by compelling state interests, and
64
must be narrowly drawn to express only those interests.”
Furthermore, in embryo disposition cases, using a
constitutional basis to decide disputes where a valid and
enforceable disposition contract is present would not constitute a
compelling state interest under the law because unlike fetuses,
65
embryos are not viable children that the state needs to protect.
Instead, we need to remember that embryos in a petri dish or
66
frozen in a tank are actually “pre-embryos.”
Ultimately, courts in the United States should base their
decisions on the enforceability of these contracts of disposition if
the contracts indeed exist. In order for the courts to be able to use
this as an option for their decisions, the legal community and the
fertility clinics need to create and make available contracts for
disposition that are separate and not simply part of their informed
consent documents. Each fertility clinic should require all of their
patients to sign disposition of embryos agreements that have been
drafted and reviewed by attorneys with the patients prior to the
treatment commencing, and possibly after the treatment has
concluded. If this procedure were followed, it is more likely that
the majority of these agreements would hold up in court as
binding, legal agreements that would follow the rules of other
enforceable contracts.
B. Personhood Versus Property Issues Related to Embryo Disposition
Another aspect of embryos and their disposition that makes
the legal landscape much more complicated is the debate over
63. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). In Carey,
the United States Supreme Court declared the New York statute criminalizing the
sale or distribution of contraceptives to minors under the age of sixteen
unconstitutional. Id.
64. Id. at 686 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155–56 (1973)).
65. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (2008).
66. See DAAR, supra note 2.
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whether embryos should be considered legal persons or property.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines person as:
a human being (i.e. natural person) . . . [the] scope and
delineation of [the] term is necessary for determining
those to whom [the] Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution affords protection since this Amendment
expressly applies to ‘person’ . . . [the] word ‘person’ as
used in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the
67
unborn.
Under this strict legal definition of a person, an embryo (or
pre-embryo as discussed earlier and which is not yet a viable fetus)
would not be considered a person under the law. Property,
however, is defined as:
that which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which
belongs exclusively to one. In the strict legal sense, an
aggregate of right which are guaranteed and protected by
the government. . . . More specifically, ownership; the
unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing the right to
dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it,
68
and to exclude everyone else from interfering with it.
Embryos, however, do not neatly fit under this definition of
property, either, because they cannot be disposed of in every state
and no one party holds exclusive rights to them. This conclusion
illustrates that when it comes to embryos, the legal rights are not
exact. Rather, they are somewhere in between both definitions.
The article Individuals, Humans, and Persons: The Issue of Moral
Status, by Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, rejects the idea that
human embryos should be considered distinct human individuals
69
Instead, they
that are afforded the full rights of personhood.
argue that an embryo should be considered to be “the potential to
70
become one or more different individuals,” which would mean
that the embryo should have a special status under the law while
not being considered a full person with all of the rights afforded
under “personhood.”
In Davis, the Supreme Court of Tennessee analyzed this exact
issue in determining the legal status of the Davis’ embryos (and
embryos in general). The court determined that under Tennessee
67. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1382 (4th ed. 1968).
68. Id. at 845.
69. See Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer, Individuals, Humans, and Persons: The Issue
of Moral Status, EMBRYO EXPERIMENTATION 65–75 (1990).
70. Id. at 75.
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law, as “embryos develop, they are accorded more respect than
mere human cells because of their burgeoning potential for
71
[human] life.” The court, however, did not believe that embryos
should be afforded the full rights and respects of personhood
because they only had the potential to become human life, while the
embryos were not yet at the stage in which they could be
72
considered human life—legally. The court also went on to say
that a person’s embryo could not be afforded the full rights of
personhood simply because of its potential. Unlike a fetus, it had
73
yet to reach the developmental stage of individuality. Using these
arguments, the court in Davis held that “[embryos] are not, strictly
speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an interim
category that entitles them to special respect because of their
74
potential for human life.” Yet, they also held that the parties did
have an interest in the ownership of the embryos because they were
allowed to make the decisions based upon the disposition of these
75
embryos.
Another case that explores the arguments of personhood
76
versus property is Litowitz v. Litowitz in which the petitioner sought
ownership over two cryopreserved embryos that were the product
of donor egg and her ex-husband’s (the respondent) sperm. The
respondent wished to donate their remaining embryos to another
couple, while the petitioner wished to implant the remaining
77
78
embryos into a surrogate and to bring the embryos to term. The
Superior Court of Pierce County awarded full custody to the
respondent, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision
reasoning that the embryos were not biologically related to the
79
petitioner.
On further appeal, the court determined that when the parties
71. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tenn. 1992).
72. Id. at 596. The Davis court also explained that embryos could not be
considered the same as a human because “the ‘tissue’ involved here does have the
potential for developing into independent human life, even if it is not yet legally
recognizable as human life itself.” Id. at 595.
73. Id. at 595.
74. Id. at 597.
75. Id.
76. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
77. The surrogate or surrogate mother is also the gestational carrier. A third
party that is not either of the parties in this case and not biologically connected in
any way to the embryos or resulting child (if there were one). See generally id.
78. Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 264.
79. Id. at 265–68.
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commenced the egg donation process, they signed a contract that
stated that the donated eggs belonged to both parties with the
petitioner being considered the “intended mother” of any child
80
produced from the resulting embryos. In the petitioner’s Writ of
Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Washington, she argued that
the state of California ruled that human byproducts (including
81
sperm) cannot be deemed property per se because “one could
82
not have a right in one’s own genetic material.” Ultimately, the
court held that the couple was required to follow the terms of their
83
embryo disposition agreement with the clinic.
When applying all of the definitions and rulings of the various
cases above, it is evident that the status of embryos remains a gray
area within the legal field. If a case such as Litowitz came before a
court in Louisiana, a different result would likely follow as the party
requesting destruction would certainly fail due to the statutory
restrictions in that state.
While a ruling by the United States Supreme Court regarding
the status of embryos would likely give the legal community a
bright line precedent as to what the exact status of embryos are
under the law, this could also backfire for the assisted reproductive
community, especially if the Court ruled that embryos should be
considered full persons—making many aspects of ART illegal
throughout the country. Nevertheless, there needs to be a guiding
principle regarding embryo disposition that can be used
throughout the fertility community to allow ART to continue with
its many needed breakthroughs. This needs to be accomplished
while providing a roadmap for doctors, patients, and legal
practitioners, especially since interstate travel is often a common
necessity for many couples turning to ART.
IV. EMBRYO DISPOSITION TODAY: ENHANCED LEGAL LANDSCAPE
THROUGH ROMAN v. ROMAN
One case that illustrates how the United States Supreme Court
would likely rule in a case of embryo disposition is Roman v.
84
Roman, which was denied certiorari in March of 2008. Roman is a
80. Id. at 268.
81. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Wash. 1990).
82. Id. at 490.
83. Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 271.
84. Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. Civ. App. 2006), cert. denied, 128
S.Ct. 2469 (2008).
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Texas case that was initiated after Augusta Roman
(petitioner/wife) and Randy Roman (respondent/husband)
divorced and the petitioner attempted to use the embryos that they
85
had created to become pregnant on her own.
The disagreement between the parties actually began the night
before the parties had planned the implantation of their created
embryos. Instead of implanting the embryos the next day, they had
the remaining three cryopreserved in the interim until they could
86
both agree on what would be the best course of action.
Unfortunately, they were unable to agree on the disposition of
87
This
these cryopreserved embryos and subsequently divorced.
88
dispute over their cryopreserved embryos arose from that divorce,
even though they had both signed an informed consent form at
their fertility clinic stating how the embryos would be used if they
89
were to divorce.
Although writ was denied, the legal field may be able to
deduce what the Supreme Court’s opinion would be in such cases
of embryo disposition by looking to both parties’ petitions to the
Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court’s
subsequent denial.
In the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari the petitioner, Augusta
Roman, presented three questions for the Justices to decide:
1. Is the fundamental right to procreate violated by a judicial
order denying implantation of embryos by a genetic parent who is
unable to conceive or bear a biological child by other means?
2. Does the constitutional liberty interest in deciding whether to
bear or beget a child encompass a right to deny implantation of
embryos in a genetic parent who desires the implantation?
3. Is the fundamental right to enter into familial relationships
violated by a judicial order denying implantation of embryos by a
genetic parent who is unable to conceive or bear a child by other

85. Id. at 43.
86. Brief for Randy M. Roman in Opposition No. 07-926 at 8, Roman v.
Roman, 128 S.Ct. 2469 (2008).
87. Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 43.
88. The Texas trial court awarded custody of the embryos to Augusta as
“property,” to which Randy hastily appealed. Id. The Texas Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court’s ruling, granting the embryos to Randy by enforcing the
contract that the parties signed at the fertility clinic. Id. at 55.
89. Id. at 44.
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90

Each of these questions presented by the petitioner dealt
directly with the Constitutional right to have children in opposition
to the Constitutional right to avoid procreation, which is the most
argued issue in embryo disposition cases. The petitioner also
argued that this was her last chance to have biological children
because at the age of 46 she was too old to successfully complete
91
another cycle of IVF. The respondent revealed (outside of court
documents), however, that he offered to pay for another IVF cycle
for the petitioner with the use of donor sperm immediately
92
following their divorce.
In opposition, the respondent presented the following
questions to the Court:
1. Can prospective parents, by signing a standard contract
required by almost all fertility clinics before they begin the in vitro
fertilization process, waive whatever constitutional rights to
procreate they may have in the event of divorce?
2. Can the procreation right of a woman who has less than a
1% chance of successfully using frozen pre-embryos to create a
child and who has other much more likely options for having
children outweigh the right of a man who does not want to be
forced by the government or his ex-wife to have a child against his
will?
3. Does the United States Constitution even recognize an
absolute right to procreate that justifies overruling the decisions of
all state courts that have addressed disputes over frozen preembryos, not to mention the European Court of Human Rights?
4. Should the in vitro fertilization industry be fundamentally
changed by ruling unenforceable the almost universally used
agreements between clinics and prospective parents concerning
93
disposition of frozen pre-embryos?
The respondent also argued that “[i]f there [were] a
constitutional right at issue in this case, it [would be] the right to
90. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Roman v. Roman, 128 S.Ct. 2469
(No. 07-926) at i.
91. Id. at 5 n.1.
92. Id.
93. Brief for Randy M. Roman in Opposition No. 07-926 at i, Roman, 128 S.Ct.
2469 (2008).
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94

decide whether or not to beget a child, a right” that he had as well
and with which the European Court of Human Rights and six state
supreme courts all agree. Therefore, deciding this case based on
one’s constitutional rights would effectively mean denying the
constitutional rights of another.
Furthering the arguments against using a constitutional right
approach in these cases, the respondent argued in his Brief in
Opposition to the granting of the Writ of Certiorari whether:
[T]he in vitro fertilization industry [should] be
fundamentally changed by ruling unenforceable the
almost universally used agreements between clinics and
prospective parents concerning disposition of frozen
95
[embryos].
This proposition begs the question of whether contract or
constitutional law should be the guiding area of law for all embryo
disposition disputes so that couples can continue to use ART to
create their families. The respondent additionally asserted that the
petitioner had “waived [her constitutional] right by signing the
contract with the clinic that clearly [stated that] any frozen pre96
embryos [would] be discarded in the event of divorce.”
According to United States law a person may waive his or her
constitutional rights in civil court just as he or she can in criminal
97
court.
In essence, by signing that binding and enforceable
contract with the fertility clinic, the petitioner had lost all of her
constitutional rights to procreate using those particular embryos,
although she still had the constitutional right to procreate by other
means.
In denying this Writ of Certiorari, the legal and medical field
can deduce that if the Supreme Court were to grant the hearing of
such a case, the court would most likely rule based on contract law
if a binding and enforceable contract existed between the parties
that contracted away their constitutional rights to procreate or to
98
This is why the ART community needs to
avoid procreation.
ensure that patients are signing valid, enforceable disposition
agreements under the guidance of an attorney.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 12.
Id. at i.
Id. at 18.
Overmyer Co. v. Frick, 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972).
See id.
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99

In fact, Dahl v. Angle, the Oregon Court of Appeals recently
determined that the fate of the couple’s remaining embryos would
be handled according to the embryo disposition form the couple
had agreed upon and signed at the time of the creation of the
embryos. Interestingly enough, the majority, also citing Davis in its
argument, stated that the embryos did constitute a matter of
private property, although the justices narrowly avoided calling
100
them “property.”
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the minimal case law that exists and the unlikely
intervention by the United States Supreme Court, the law
regarding embryo disposition currently rests in a gray area with no
truly consistent or binding rulings, creating legal turmoil and
uncertainties for lawyers, doctors, and parties alike.
As
practitioners, however, we need to focus on whether a contract (if
one exists) between the parties is enforceable. We also need to
realize that “if these agreements mean nothing and are rendered
101
useless,” the fertility industry has the potential to remain at a
standstill with each case being litigated to determine the parties’
true intentions simply because one party decided that he or she did
not want to follow his or her specified intent from his or her signed
contract with the fertility clinic. As we have seen in the preceding
matters, the lack of contracts regarding disposition leaves parties
with the constitutional balancing test of Kass, which ultimately will
be affected by the state in which the embryos reside.
The legal and medical communities can lessen this chance for
confusion and resulting litigation, however, by working together to
draft binding and enforceable embryo disposition agreements for
each patient to sign. Each patient should review this agreement
with an attorney prior to signing it with the fertility clinic. By
following these procedures, it is likely that these agreements will be
held enforceable.
Even if they result in litigation, the courts will likely rule in
favor of the intention(s) expressed in the embryo disposition
agreement as each party should have reviewed the agreement with
99. Dahl v. Angle, 194 P.3d 834 (Or. App. 2008).
100. See id. at 840–41.
101. Brief for Randy M. Roman in Opposition No. 07-926 at 19, Roman v.
Roman, 128 S.Ct. 2469 (2008).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009

19

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 12

488

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:2

an attorney who would have further revised the agreement to meet
the full intentions of each party. With that in mind, the parties and
their medical practitioner(s) can insure that what is actually
intended at the signing of this agreement will, in fact, be the end
result. Creating enforceable, binding agreements is the least that
can be done by the courts, medical practitioners and legal
professionals, considering that the law does not classify embryos as
persons or as property. It is clear, however, that embryos hold a
special and unique status in the law.
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